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Abstract
This paper studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field two-
players stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the
optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions
the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected
Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Motivations are given
as optimal harvesting of stochastic mean-field systems, optimal irreversible investments
under uncertainty and mean-field singular investment games. In particular, a simple
singular mean-field investment game is studied, where the Nash equilibrium exists but
is not unique.
1 Introduction
Mean-field stochastic differential equations (SDEs) have been the subject of much attention
in the mathematics research literature recently. This is mainly due to their interesting
applications in mathematical physics and more recently in models for systemic risk, but also
because they represent natural generalizations of independent interest of classical SDEs.
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The purpose of this paper is to study singular control problems for mean-field SDEs,
and to give methods for solving such problems, in terms of finding the optimal controls.
We shall also study in this paper singular mean-field non-zero stochastic differential games.
Let us point out that the terminology “mean field game” has been used in the literature to
represent the limit when the number of players in the game becomes large (see e.g. [12], [14],
[6]). Here we consider two-players games with mean-field terms in the state dynamics and
in the performance functional. We establish necessary and sufficient maximum principles for
the optimal control for such games and their corresponding Nash equilibria. To illustrate
the theory we give some solvable examples and provide cases where the Nash equilibrium is
not unique. See e.g. Proposition 5.1.
For mean field singular control the stochastic maximum principle method yields back-
ward stochastic differential equations with mean field term and with reflection. We shall
combine here the contraction mapping technique with some recent results of Burdzy, Kang
and Ramanan (2009) on the Skorohod mapping for time dependent interval [4] to obtain
the existence and uniqueness of these equations. Note that we assume local convexity of
the set of admissible controls to avoid second order adjoint equations for the necessary max-
imum principle (see [23], [25]). We assume some concavity conditions of the Hamiltonian
and terminal payoff to get sufficient optimality conditions (see Theorem 3.2 and Theorem
4.1 below).
Recently, there have been several works dealing with mean-field control problems. See
e.g. Bensoussan et al [2], Buckdahn et al (2011) [3], Carmona and Delarue (2013) [5], Meyer-
Brandis et al (2012) [15], Anderson and Djehiche (2011) [1] and Hamadène (1998) [9].
The article most closely related to ours is a recent paper [26] by L. Zhang (2012), dealing with
mean-field singular control. Our paper extends this paper in several directions: First, the
mean-field operators are extended to a general (nonlinear) Fréchet differentiable functional
Y of the state variable. Secondly, we allow the profit rate f in the performance functional
to depend on the mean-field term Y as well as the singular control ξ, in addition to its
dependence on the state X itself. Third, we allow both the coefficient λ in the singular part
of the state equation and the singular cost coefficient h in the performance functional to
depend on the state X. Moreover, we consider games between two players of such singular
control problems with asymmetric information. Let us also mention that in our paper’s
framework, but without singular control, a stochastic maximum principle is obtained and
the existence of Nash equilibria is proved in [10].
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present three motivating examples.
In Section 3 we formulate a general mean-field singular stochastic control problem and prove
a sufficient maximum principle and a necessary maximum principle. We then reduce the
maximum principle to a Skorohod problem and prove the existence and uniqueness of the
solution. We illustrate our results on an optimal harvesting problem of a mean-field system.
In Section 4 we prove maximum principles for singular mean-field stochastic games with two
players and we obtain as a corollary a corresponding maximum principle for zero-sum games.
In Section 5 we apply these results to a mean field investment game and to singular control
with model uncertainty.
2
2 Three motivating examples
2.1 Optimal harvesting from a mean-field system
Let us model the density X0(t) of an unharvested population at time t by an equation of
the form
dX0(t) = E[X0(t)]b(t)dt+X0(t)σ(t)dB(t), t ∈ [0, T ]; X0(0) = x > 0. (2.1)
Here, and in the following, B(t) = B(t, ω) is a Brownian motion on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,F := {Ft}t≥0, P ) satisfying the usual conditions. P is a reference probability
measure, and we assume that F is the Brownian filtration. We assume that b(t) and σ(t)
are given predictable processes. We may heuristically regard (2.1) as a limit as n → ∞ of
a large population interacting system of the form
dxi,n(t) = [
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj,n(t)]b(t)dt+ xi,n(t)σ(t)dBi(t), i = 1, 2, ..., n, (2.2)
where we have devided the whole lake into a grid of size n and xi,n(t) represents the density
in box i of the grid. Thus the mean-field term E[X(t)] represents an approximation to the
weighted average 1
n
∑n
j=1 x
j,n(t) for large n.
Now suppose we introduce harvesting of the population. The density of the harvested
population X(t) = Xξ(t) at time t can then be modeled by a mean-field singular control
stochastic differential equation of the form
dX(t) = E[X(t)]b(t)dt+X(t)σ(t)dB(t)− λ0(t)dξ(t); t ∈ [0, T ] ;X(0) = x > 0 (2.3)
where ξ(t) is a non-decreasing predictable process with ξ(0−) = 0, representing the harvesting
effort, while λ0(t) > 0 is a given harvesting efficiency coefficient.
The performance functional is assumed to be of the form
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
o
h0(t)X(t)dξ(t) +KX(T )
]
, (2.4)
where h0(t) is a given adapted price process and K = K(ω) is a given salvage price, assumed
to be FT -measurable. The problem is to find ξ∗ such that
J(ξ∗) = sup
ξ
J(ξ) . (2.5)
Such a process ξ∗ is called an optimal singular control. This is an example of a mean-field
singular control problem. We will return to this problem in Example 3.5.
3
2.2 A mean field investment game
Arguing as in Section 2.1 let us assume that the demand density (demand per area unit)
X(t) for a certain product at time t is given by a mean field SDE of the form
dX(t) = E[X(t)]b(t)dt+X(t)σ(t)dB(t); X(0) = x > 0 .
Alternatively, we might think of X(t) as the demand at time t of a representative agent.
There are two competing companies producing this product, with production rate capacities
represented by nondecreasing adapted processes ξ1, ξ2, respectively. The expected profit of
the company i is assumed to have the form
Ji(ξ1, ξ2) = E
[∫ T
0
π(t) min(X(t), ξ1(t) + ξ2(t))dt+
∫ T
0
hi(t)dξi(t)
]
,
where π(t) > 0 is the price per unit sold and hi(t) < 0 is the production cost per unit for
the factory i, i = 1, 2. We want to find a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a pair (ξ∗1 , ξ
∗
2) ∈ A1 × A2
such that
sup
ξ1∈A1
J1(ξ1, ξ
∗
2) ≤ J1(ξ∗1 , ξ∗2)
and
sup
ξ2∈A2
J2(ξ
∗
1 , ξ2) ≤ J2(ξ∗1 , ξ∗2) ,
where Ai is the family of admissible controls ξi for company number i; i = 1, 2. We will
return to this problem in Section 5.1.
2.3 Optimal irreversible investments under model uncertainty
The irreversible investment problem is a classical problem in economics, with a long history.
It has been studied by many authors in different contexts. See e.g. Pindyck (1988, 1991,
1991),[20, 21, 22], Kobila (1993) [13] and the references therein.
In short, the problem is the following. A factory is facing an increased demand for its
product. Should it invest in more production capacity to meet the demand? The problem is
that buying additional production capacity is an expensive, irreversible investment (usually
production equipment cannot easily be sold after use) and the future demand for the product
is uncertain. So the risk is that the factory ends up having paid for an additional capacity
it does not need. On the other hand, if the factory does not increase the capacity, it might
miss an opportunity for an increased sale. Mathematically the problem can be formulated
as a singular control problem: indeed, since the investment is irreversible, the control of the
investor is a singular control, i.e. a non-decreasing non-negative stochastic process.
Let ξ(t) denote the production rate capacity of a production plant and let X(t) denote
the demand rate at time t. At any time t the production capacity can be increased by dξ(t)
at the price h(t,X(t)) per capacity unit. The number of units sold per time unit is the
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minimum of the demand X(t) and the capacity ξ(t). The total expected net profit of the
production is assumed to be
J(ξ, θ) = EQθ
[∫ T
0
a(t,E[ϕ(X(t))]) min[X(t), ξ(t)]dt+g(X(T ))−
∫ T
0
h(t,X(t))dξ(t)
]
, (2.6)
where g(X(T )) is some salvage value of the closed-down production plant, E[ϕ(X(t))] denotes
the expectation with respect to a reference probability measure P , ϕ is a given real function
and a(t,E[ϕ(X(t))]) is the unit sales price of the production. We think it gives a more
realistic model to allow the sales price to depend on the average demand rate of the product
at any give time.
We study this problem under model uncertainty, in the sense of Knight uncertainty,
i.e. uncertainty about the underlying probability measure. Using the Girsanov theorem for
Itô processes we can parameterize the family of densities of possible underlying probability
measures by a stochastic process θ(t).
Here {Qθ}θ∈Θ is a family of probability measures representing the model uncertainty.
We let AG denote the set of right-continuous, non-decreasing G-adapted processes ξ(·) with
ξ(0−) = 0, where G := {Gt}t≥0 is a given subfiltration of F, in the sense that Gt ⊆ Ft for all
t. Heuristically, Gt represents the information available to the investor at time t. We assume
that the demand X(t) is given by a diffusion of the form
dX(t) = X(t) [α(t, ω)dt+ β(t, ω)dB(t)] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ;X(0) > 0 (2.7)
where α(t, ω), β(t, ω) are given F-adapted processes. We want to maximize the expected
total net profit under the worst possible scenario, i.e. find (ξ∗, θ∗) ∈ AG ×Θ such that
sup
ξ∈AG
inf
θ∈Θ
J(ξ, θ) = inf
θ∈Θ
sup
ξ∈AG
J(ξ, θ) = J(ξ∗, θ∗). (2.8)
This leads to a stochastic differential zero-sum game in which one of the players is the in-
vestor controlling the investment strategy and the other player controls the model parameter
θ.
This is an example of a (partial information) singular control game problem. Note that
the system is non-Markovian, both because of the mean-field term and the partial information
constraint. See Section 5.2.
3 Maximum principles for singular mean field control
problems
3.1 Problem statement
We first recall some basic concepts and results from Banach space theory. Throughout
this paper, we assume that the probability space Ω is a Banach space, where (Ω,F ,F :=
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{Ft}t≥0, P ) is as introduced in the beginning of Section 2. Throughout this paper G :=
{Gt}t≥0 is a given subfiltration of F.
Let V be an open subset of a Banach space X with norm ‖ · ‖ and let F : V → R.
(i) We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gâteaux derivative) at x ∈ X in the
direction y ∈ X if
DyF (x) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
(F (x+ εy)− F (x))
exists.
(ii) We say that F is Fréchet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a continuous linear map
L : X → R such that
lim
h→0
h∈X
1
‖h‖
|F (x+ h)− F (x)− L(h)| = 0.
In this case we call L the gradient (or Fréchet derivative) of F at x and we write
L = ∇xF.
(iii) If F is Fréchet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all directions y ∈ X
and
DyF (x) = ∇xF (y) =: 〈∇xF, y〉.
In particular, if X = L2(P ) the Fréchet derivative of F at X ∈ L2(P ), denoted by ∇XF ,
is a bounded linear functional on L2(P ). Since L2(P ) is a Hilbert space, we can identify
∇xF with a random variable in L2(P ). We shall then regard ∇xF as an element in L2. For
example, if F (X) = E[ϕ(X)];X ∈ L2(P ), where ϕ is a real C1- function such that ϕ(X) ∈
L2(P ) and ∂ϕ
∂x
(X) ∈ L2(P ), then with the above identification, we have ∇XF = ∂ϕ∂x (X) and
∇XF (Y ) = 〈∂ϕ∂x (X), Y 〉 = E[
∂ϕ
∂x
(X)Y ] for Y ∈ L2(P ).
Consider a mixed regular and singular controlled finite dimensional system with state
process X(t) = Xξ,u(t) of the form
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt+ σ(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dB(t)
+ λ(t,X(t), u(t), ω)dξ(t), (3.1)
where X(t) ∈ Rd is a d dimensional adapted process, ξ(t) and u(t) are Rm and Rn valued
G-adapted processes,
Y (t) = F (X(t, ·)) (3.2)
and F is a Fréchet differentiable operator on L2(P ).
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The performance functional is assumed to be of the form
J(ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T ), ω)
+
∫ T
0
h(t,X(t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dξ(t)
]
. (3.3)
We may interpret the function f as a profit rate, g as a bequest or salvage value function
and h as a cost rate for the use of the singular control ξ.
Assumption 3.1. Throughout this paper we assume that the functions b, σ, λ, f, g and h
are progressively measurable with respect to (t, ω) for all fixed x, y, ξ, u and continuously
differentiable with respect to x, y, ξ, u with bounded derivatives.
We want to find (ξ∗, u∗) ∈ A such that
J(ξ∗, u∗) = sup
(ξ,u)∈A
J(ξ, u) . (3.4)
Here A = AG is the family of G-predictable processes such that the corresponding state
equation has a unique solution X such that ω → X(t, ω) ∈ L2(P ) for all t. We let A denote
the set of possible values of u(t); t ∈ [0, T ] when (ξ, u) ∈ A.
3.2 A sufficient maximum principle
We prove below a sufficient maximum principle for the singular control problem described
by (3.1) and (3.3). To this end, define the singular Hamiltonian H as follows:
H(t, x, y, ξ, u, p, q)(dt, ξ(dt))
= H0(t, x, y, ξ, u, p, q)dt+ {λ(t, x, u)p+ h(t, x, ξ, u)}dξ(t) , (3.5)
where
H0(t, x, y, ξ, u, p, q) := f(t, x, y, ξ, u) + b(t, x, y, ξ, u)p+ σ(t, x, y, ξ, u)q . (3.6)
We assume that for H is Fréchet differentiable (C1) in the variables x, y, ξ, u.
The associated mean-field BSDE for the adjoint processes is
dp(t) = −∂H0
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−∂H0
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), p(t), q(t))∇X(t)Fdt
−
{
∂λ
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t))p(t) +
∂h
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t))
}
dξ(t) + q(t)dB(t); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
p(T ) =
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E
[
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))
]
∇X(T )F.
(3.7)
7
Note that since we identify ∇X(t) and ∇X(T ) as elements in L2(Ω, P ), the above equation
is well-defined as a finite dimensional backward stochastic differential equation. See also
equation (4.6) below and other places.
Existence and uniqueness results for this type (3.1) & (3.7) of forward-backward SDEs
with singular drift seem to an unexplored area of research. However, some partial results
can be found in the recent paper [7].
Theorem 3.2 (Sufficient maximum principle for mean-field singular control.). Let ξ̂, û ∈ A
be such that the system of (3.1) and (3.7) has a solution X̂(t), p̂(t), q̂(t) and set Ŷ (t) =
F (X̂(t, ·)). Suppose the following conditions hold
• (The concavity assumptions)
The functions
Rd × L2(P )× Rm × Rn 3 (x,X, ξ, u)→ H(t, x, F (X), ξ, u, p̂(t), q̂(t), ω)
and
X → g(X,F (X))
are concave for all t ∈ [0, T ] and almost all ω ∈ Ω. (3.8)
• (The conditional maximum property)
ess sup
v∈A
E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), v, p̂(t), q̂(t)) | Gt]
= E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), û(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | Gt] a.s. (3.9)
• (Variational inequality)
ess sup
ξ
E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ, û(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | Gt]
= E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), û(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | Gt] a.s. (3.10)
Then (ξ̂(t), û(t)) is an optimal control for J(ξ, u).
Proof. This theorem is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 4.1 below. We refer to
the proof there. 
3.3 A necessary maximum principle
In the previous section we gave a verification theorem, stating that if a given control (ξ̂, û)
satisfies (3.8)-(3.10), then it is indeed optimal for the singular mean field control problem. We
now establish a partial converse, implying that if a control (ξ̂, û) is optimal for the singular
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mean field control problem, then it is a conditional critical point for the Hamiltonian.
To achieve this, we start with the setup of [16] as follows. For (u, ξ) ∈ A, let V(ξ) denote the
set of G-adapted processes η of finite variation such that there exists δ = δ(ξ) > 0 satisfying
(u, ξ + aη) ∈ A for all a ∈ [0, δ]. (3.11)
Then for (u, ξ) ∈ A and η ∈ V(ξ) we have, by our smoothness assumptions on the coefficients,
lim
a→0+
1
a
(J(ξ + aη)− J(ξ)) = E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t))Z(t)
+
∂f
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t))〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
∂f
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t))dη(t)
]
+ E
[
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T ))Z(T ) +
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))〈∇X(T )F,Z(T )〉
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∂h
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t))Z(t)dξ(t) +
∫ T
0
h(t,X(t), u(t))dη(t)
]
(3.12)
where
Z(t) := lim
a→0+
1
a
(
X(ξ+aη)(t)−X(ξ)(t)
)
. (3.13)
Note that by the chain rule we have
lim
a→0+
1
a
(
Y (ξ+aη)(t)− Y (ξ)(t)
)
= lim
a→0+
1
a
(
F
(
X(ξ+aη)(t))− F (X(ξ)(t)
))
= 〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉 .
(3.14)
Moreover,
dZ(t) =
(
∂b
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂b
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉+
∂b
∂ξ
(t)η(t)
)
dt
+
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂σ
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉+
∂σ
∂ξ
(t)η(t)
)
dB(t)
+
∂λ
∂x
(t)Z(t)dξ(t) + λ(t)dη(t) ; Z(0) = 0 , (3.15)
where we did not write the explicit dependence of the functions b, σ and λ on their arguments
X, Y , ξ, and η for simplicity.
Remark 3.3. It is not obvious that the limit in (3.13) exists. We refer to [24] for a study
of this issue in a related setting. Assuming that the limit exists, the computation leading to
(3.15) is straightforward. For details see e.g. page 469 in [19].
We can now state and prove a necessary maximum principle:
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Theorem 3.4 (Necessary maximum principle for mean-field singular control).
Suppose (ξ̂, û) ∈ A is optimal, i.e. satisfies (3.4). Suppose the following processes ηi(s), i =
1, 2, 3 belong to V(ξ̂):
η1(s) := α(ω)χ[t,T ](s), where α > 0 is Gt −measurable, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
η2(s) := ξ̂(s),
η3(s) := −ξ̂(s), s ∈ [0, T ].
Then
E
[
∂H
∂u
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), u, p̂(t), q̂(t))u=û(t) | Gt
]
= 0 a.s. (3.16)
Moreover, the following variational inequalities hold.
E
[
∂H0
∂ξ
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), û(t)) + λ(t, X̂(t), û(t))p̂(t) + h(t, X̂(t), û(t)) | Gt
]
≤ 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. and
E
[
∂H0
∂ξ
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), û(t)) + λ(t, X̂(t), û(t))p̂(t) + h(t, X̂(t), û(t)) | Gt
]
dξ̂(t) = 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s.
(3.17)
Proof. The proof of (3.16) is analogous to the non singular mean field control case and
is omitted here. We shall prove (3.17) in the case when there is no control u. We need to
prove that if ξ̂ ∈ A is optimal, i.e. if
sup
ξ∈A
J(ξ) = J(ξ̂) (3.18)
then ξ̂ satisfies (3.17). To this end, choose ξ ∈ A and η ∈ V(ξ) and compute
d
da
J(ξ + aη) |a=0= A1 + A2 + A3 + A4, (3.19)
where
A1 = E
[∫ T
0
{
∂f
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂f
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉
}
dt
]
A2 = E
[∫ T
0
∂f
∂ξ
(t)dη(t)
]
A3 = E
[
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T ))Z(T ) +
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))〈∇X(T )F,Z(T )〉
]
A4 = E
[∫ T
0
∂h
∂x
(t)Z(t)ξ(dt) + h(t)dη(t)
]
. (3.20)
10
By the definition of H0 we have
A1 = E
[∫ T
0
Z(t)
{
∂H0
∂x
(t)− ∂b
∂x
(t)p(t)− ∂σ
∂x
(t)q(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉
(
∂H0
∂y
(t)− ∂b
∂y
(t)p(t)− ∂σ
∂y
(t)q(t)
)
dt
]
. (3.21)
By the terminal condition of p(T ) (see (3.7)) and then by the Itô formula we have
A3 = E[p(T )Z(T )]
= E
[∫ T
0
p(t)dZ(t) +
∫ T
0
Z(t)dp(t) +
∫ T
0
q(t)
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂σ
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉+
∂σ
∂ξ
(t)η(t)
)
dt
= E
[∫ T
0
p(t)
{
∂b
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂b
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉+
∂b
∂ξ
(t)η(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
p(t)
∂λ
∂x
(t)Z(t)dξ(t) +
∫ T
0
p(t)λ(t)dη(t)−
∫ T
0
(
∂H0
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂H0
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉
)
dt
−
∫ T
0
Z(t){∂λ
∂x
(t)p(t) +
∂h
∂x
(t)}dξ(t) +
∫ T
0
q(t)
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Z(t) +
∂σ
∂y
(t)〈∇X(t)F,Z(t)〉
)
dt.
(3.22)
Combining (3.19)-(3.22) we get
d
da
J(ξ + aη) |a=0= E
[∫ T
0
{
∂H0
∂ξ
(s) + λ(s)p(s) + h(s)
}
dη(s)
]
.
In particular, if we apply this to an optimal ξ = ξ̂ for J we get, for all η ∈ V(ξ̂),
E
[∫ T
0
{
∂Ĥ0
∂ξ
(s) + λ̂(t)p̂(s) + ĥ(s)
}
dη(s)
]
=
d
da
J(ξ̂ + aη)a=0 ≤ 0. (3.23)
where we have denoted Ĥ0(t) := H0(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), û(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)); λ̂(t) := λ(t, X̂(t), û(t));
and ĥ(t) := h(t, X̂(t), û(t)).
If we choose η to be a pure jump process of the form
η(s) =
∑
0<ti≤s
α(ti)
where α(s) > 0 is Gs-measurable for all s, (3.23) gives
E
[(
∂Ĥ0
∂ξ
(t) + λ̂(t)p̂(t) + ĥ(t)
)
α(ti)
]
≤ 0 for all ti a.s.
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Since this holds for all such η with arbitrary ti, we conclude that
E
[
∂Ĥ0
∂ξ
(t) + λ̂(t)p̂(t) + ĥ(t) | Gt
]
≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. (3.24)
Finally, applying (3.23) to
dη(t) = dξ̂(t) ∈ V(ξ̂)
and then to
dη(t) = −dξ̂(t) ∈ V(ξ̂)
we get, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
E
[
∂Ĥ0
∂ξ
(t) + λ̂(t)p̂(t) + ĥ(t) | Gt
]
dξ̂(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. . (3.25)
With (3.24) and (3.25) the proof is complete. 
3.4 The optimality conditions
Since there have already been studies (see e.g. [15] and references therein) on the usual
(nonsingular) mean field control problems, let us consider only the singular control ξ, i.e.
without regular control u. More precisely, the system that we deal with, is described by
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t) + λ(t,X(t))dξ(t) , (3.26)
with Y (t) = F (X(t, ·)). The performance functional is
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T )) +
∫ T
0
h(t,X(t))dξ(t)
]
. (3.27)
We also assume that the full information is available to the controller. If we apply the
Theorem 3.2 to the above singular control problem, we have the following description for the
optimal control.
The auxiliary backward stochastic differential equation with mean field is
dp(t) = −
[
∂f
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + ∂b
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))p(t)
+∂σ
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))q(t)
]
dt− E
[
∂f
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))
+ ∂b
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))p(t) + ∂σ
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))q(t)
]
∇X(t)Fdt
−{∂λ
∂x
(t,X(t))p(t) + ∂h
∂x
(t,X(t))}ξ(dt) + q(t)dB(t) ,
p(T ) = ∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E
[
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))
]
∇X(T )F .
(3.28)
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We denote
α1(t) = − ∂b∂x(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))−
∂b
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
α2(t) = −∂λ∂x(t,X(t))
β(t) = −∂σ
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))− ∂σ
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
φ1(t) = −∂f∂x(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))−
∂f
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))∇X(t)F
φ2(t) = −∂h∂x(t,X(t))
Θ = ∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E
[
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))
]
∇X(T )F .
(3.29)
We also denote, for 0 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ T
ρt,r := exp
{∫ r
t
β(s)dWs +
∫ r
t
[
α1(s)−
1
2
β2(s)
]
ds+
∫ r
t
α2(s)dξ(s)
}
.
Then a straightforward application of Equation (2.11) of [11] to the above BSDE yields
p(t) = E
(
Θρt,T +
∫ T
t
ρt,rφ1(r)dr +
∫ T
t
ρt,rφ2(r)dξ(r)
∣∣Ft) . (3.30)
With this p and q, the optimal control for the above problem satisfies the following equations
∂f
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + ∂b
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))p(t) + ∂σ
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))q(t)
+λ(t,X(t))p(t) + h(t,X(t)) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. and
[∂f
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + ∂b
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))p(t) + ∂σ
∂ξ
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))q(t)
+λ(t,X(t))p(t) + h(t,X(t))]dξ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s.
(3.31)
We obtain an equation which describes the domain D in which the process X(t) must
live all the time. We control the process X(t) in such a way that when the process is in the
interior of the domain D, we don’t do anything. When the process reaches the boundary of
D, we exercise the minimal push to keep the process inside the domain D.
Equation (3.31) are essentially an equation for the “domain” of the state X(t) and the
condition for the singular control ξ to satisfy. It can be complicated since the solution p(t)
may depend on the paths of X, Y and the path of control ξ itself up to time t. Denote
Xt := (X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
the trajectory of X up to time t, and similarly for Yt and ξt. Then p(t) can be represented
in general as p(t) = p(Xt, Yt, ξt).
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We now consider a slightly more general situation, where the singular control may be
any finite variation process, not necessarily increasing. The increasing case corresponds to
r(t,Xt, Yt, ξt) =∞ below.
Suppose that there are two functionals l, r : [0, T ] × C([0, T ],R)3 → R with l ≤ r such
that the equations (3.31) can be written as
l(t,Xt, Yt, ξt) ≤ X(t) ≤ r(t,Xt, Yt, ξt)∫ T
0
[X(t)− l(t,Xt, Yt, ξt)] dξ(t) = 0∫ T
0
[r(t,Xt, Yt, ξt)−X(t)] dξ(t) = 0 .
(3.32)
Then we are led to the problem of finding a finite variation (not necessarily increasing)
control ξ for the system
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t) + λ(t,X(t))dξ(t) (3.33)
satisfying (3.32). This is a Skorohod type problem.
For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the case when
λ(t, x) = 1 .
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that the following hold
1. b and σ are uniformly Lipschitz continuous, that is there exists L > 0 such that
|b(t, x2, y2, ξ2)− b(t, x1, y1, ξ1)| ≤ L(|x2 − x1|+ |y2 − y1|+ |ξ2 − ξ1|) . (3.34)
The same inequality holds for σ.
2. l and r are uniformly Lipschitz continuous, i.e. for some L > 0,
|r(t,X2t , Y 2t , ξ2t )− r(t,X1t , Y 1t , ξ1t )| ≤ κ sup
0≤s≤t
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|+ |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|
]
+ L
∫ t
0
sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s) + |Y 2(s)− Y 1(s)|+ |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|
]
dr (3.35)
for some 0 < κ < 1/4. The same inequality holds for l.
3. For any t ∈ [0, T ], X, Y and ξ in C([0, T ] ,R),
l(t,Xt, Yt, ξt) < r(t,Xt, Yt, ξt) . (3.36)
Then, Equations (3.32)-(3.33) have a unique solution.
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Proof. We shall apply the Banach fixed point theorem. Let B denote the Banach space of
all continuous adapted processes (X(t), ξ(t)) which are square integrable. More precisely,
B =
{
(X, ξ) , X and ξ are continuous and adapted and
‖(X, ξ)‖B := {E sup
0≤t≤T
(
|X(t)|2 + |ξ(t)|2
)
}1/2 <∞
}
.
From (3.32) and (3.33), we define the following mapping on B: F (X, ξ) = (Z, η), where
(Z, η) satisfies the inequalities
l(t,Xt, Yt, ξt) ≤ Z(t) ≤ r(t,Xt, Yt, ξt)∫ T
0
[X(t)− l(t,Xt, Yt, ξt)] dη(t) = 0∫ T
0
[r(t,Xt, Yt, ξt)−X(t)] dη(t) = 0 ,
(3.37)
and, in addition,
dZ(t) = b(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dt+ σ(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t))dB(t) + dη(t). (3.38)
For a given continuous pair (X(t), ξ(t)) in B, the problem to find a pair (Z(t), η(t)) such that
(3.37), (3.38) hold is an example of a Skorohod reflection problem. See e.g. [8]. By condition
(3), Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 2.4 of [4] the above Skorohod problem has a unique solution
(Z(t), η(t)) and the solution pair (Z(t), η(t)) can be represented as
η(t) = Ξ(l, r, ψ)(t) (3.39)
Z(t) = ψ(t)− η(t) , (3.40)
where
ψ(t) :=
∫ t
0
b(s,X(s), Y (s), ξ(s))ds+
∫ t
0
σ(s,X(s), Y (s), ξ(s))dB(s)
l(u) := l(u,Xu, Yu, ξu)
r(u) := r(u,Xu, Yu, ξu)
Ξ(l, r, ψ)(t) := max
{[
(ψ(0)− r(0))+ ∧ inf
u∈[0,t]
(ψ(u)− l(u))
]
,
sup
s∈[0,t]
[
(ψ(s)− r(s)) ∧ inf
u∈[s,t]
(ψ(u)− l(u))
]}
.
It is elementary to see that
|max{b1, b2} −max{a1, a2}| ≤ max{|b1 − a1|, |b2 − a2|}∣∣∣∣ sup
0≤t≤T
g(t)− sup
0≤t≤T
f(t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
0≤t≤T
|g(t)− f(t)|∣∣∣∣ inf0≤t≤T g(t)− inf0≤t≤T f(t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
0≤t≤T
|g(t)− f(t)| .
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From the expression of Ξ, we get that
sup
0≤s≤t
|Ξ(l2, r2, ψ2)(s)− Ξ(l1, r1, ψ1)(s)| ≤2 sup
0≤s≤t
[|l2(s)− l1(s)|+ |r2(s)− r1(s)|]
+ 4 sup
0≤s≤t
[|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|] . (3.41)
Now we want to show that
B 3 (X, ξ)→ F (X, ξ) = (Z, η)
is a contraction on B. Assume that (X1, ξ1) and (X2, ξ2) be two elements in B and let
(Z1, η1) and (Z2, η2) be the corresponding solutions to (3.37)-(3.38). Then for i = 1, 2, we
have
ηi(t) = Ξ(li, ri, ψi)(t) (3.42)
Zi(t) = ψi(t)− ηi(t) , (3.43)
where
ψi(t) :=
∫ t
0
b(s,X i(s), Y i(s), ξi(s))ds+
∫ t
0
σi(s,X
i(s), Y i(s), ξi(s))dB(s)
li(u) := l(u,X
i
u, Y
i
u , ξ
i
u)
ri(u) := r(u,X
i
u, Y
i
u , ξ
i
u)
ηi := Ξ(li, ri, ψi)(t) = max
{[
(ψi(0)− ri(0))+ ∧ inf
u∈[0,t]
(ψi(u)− li(u))
]
,
sup
s∈[0,t]
[
(ψi(s)− ri(s)) ∧ inf
u∈[s,t]
(ψi(u)− li(u))
]}
.
From (3.41) and then from the assumptions on l and r, we see that
E sup
0≤r≤t
|η2(r)− η1(r)|2
≤ 8E sup
0≤s≤t
[
|l2(s)− l1(s)|2 + |r2(s)− r1(s)|2
]
+ 32E sup
0≤s≤t
[
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|2
]
≤ 8κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+ 32E sup
0≤s≤t
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|2
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
dr .
By standard argument from stochastic analysis, we have
E sup
0≤s≤t
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|2 ≤ C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr .
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Thus we have
E sup
0≤r≤t
|η2(r)− η1(r)|2 ≤ 8E sup
0≤s≤t
[
|l2(s)− l1(s)|2 + |r2(s)− r1(s)|2
]
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr .
(3.44)
From (3.43) we have
E sup
0≤r≤t
|Z2(r)− Z1(r)|2 ≤ 2E sup
0≤r≤t
|η2(r)− η1(r)|2 + 2E sup
0≤r≤t
|ψ2(r)− ψ1(r)|2
≤ 16κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+64E sup
0≤s≤t
|ψ2(s)− ψ1(s)|2
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr
≤ 16κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr .
Combining the above inequality with (3.44), we have
E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|Z2(r)− Z1(r)|2 + |η2(r)− η1(r)|2
]
≤ 16κ2E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
+C
∫ t
0
E sup
0≤s≤r
[
|X2(s)−X1(s)|2 + |ξ2(s)− ξ1(s)|2
]
dr
≤ (16κ2 + Ct)E sup
0≤r≤t
[
|X2(r)−X1(r)|2 + |ξ2(r)− ξ1(r)|2
]
. (3.45)
If κ < 1/4, then we can choose t0 such that 16κ
2 + Ct < 1 for all t ≤ t0. Thus from (3.45),
we conclude that F is a contraction mapping from B to B. Following a routine argument,
we obtain the solution ξ(t), X(t) of equations (3.32) and (3.33) up to time t0. Since the
constant C in 16κ2 + Ct does not depend on the initial condition, we repeat this procedure
to solve the equations (3.32) and (3.33) on the interval [0, T ]. 
Remark 3.6. From the proof of the theorem, we see that if we define the Picard iteration
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for n = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,
l(t,X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t ) ≤ X(n+1)(t) ≤ r(t,X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t )∫ T
0
[
X(n)(t)− l(t,X(n)t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t )
]
dξ(n+1)(t) = 0
∫ T
0
[
r(t,X
(n)
t , Y
(n)
t , ξ
(n)
t )−X(n)(t)
]
dξ(n+1)(t) = 0 ,
(3.46)
and
dX(n+1)(t) = b(t,X(n)(t), Y (n)(t), ξ(n)(t))dt (3.47)
+σ(t,X(n)(t), Y (n)(t), ξ(n)(t))dB(t) + dξ(n+1)(t) ,
where X
(0)
t = X(0), ξ
(0)
t = 0, then (X
(n)(t), ξ(n)(t)) will converge to the solution (X(t), ξ(t))
in B. This may be used to construct numerical solutions.
3.5 Application to optimal harvesting problem
Let us consider an optimal harvesting problem where the population density X(t) at time t
is described by the linear controlled system
dX(t) = (b1(t)X(t) + b2(t)E[X(t)]) dt+ σ(t,X(t), Y (t))dB(t)− dξ(t) . (3.48)
We want to find ξ̂ such that
sup
ξ∈A
J(ξ) = J(ξ̂) , (3.49)
where
J(ξ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), Y (t))dt+ g(X(T )) +
∫ T
0
h(t,X(t))dξ(t)
]
,
with
f(t, x, y) := f1(t)x+ f2(t)y (3.50)
and
g(x) := Kx (3.51)
with K > 0. Then from (3.29) we get
α(t) = −b1(t)− b2(t)
β(t) = −∂σ
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t))− ∂σ
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t))
φ1(t) = −f1(t)− f2(t)
φ2(t) = −∂h∂x(t,X(t))
Θ = K .
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Denote, for 0 ≤ t ≤ r ≤ T ,
ρt,r = exp
{∫ r
t
β(s)dWs +
∫ r
t
[
α(s)ds− 1
2
β2(s)
]
ds
}
.
Since α is deterministic, we have for all t ≤ r ≤ T ,
a(t, r) := E
(
ρt,r
∣∣Ft)
= exp
{∫ r
t
α(s)ds
}
E
(
exp
{∫ r
t
β(s)dWs −
1
2
∫ r
t
β2(s)ds
} ∣∣Ft)
= exp
{∫ r
t
α(s)ds
}
.
Note that a(t, r) is a deterministic function. It is easy to see from (3.30) that
p(t) = Ka(t, T ) +
∫ T
t
a(t, r)φ1(r)dr + E[
∫ T
t
a(t, r)φ2(r)dξ(r) | Ft]. (3.52)
Thus we have the optimality conditions{
−p(t) + h(t,X(t)) ≤ 0
[−p(t) + h(t,X(t))] dξ(t) = 0 .
(3.53)
If furthermore we assume
φ(t) ≥ 0 , (3.54)
and
h(t, x) = h0(t)x
κ , with h0(t) positive and κ 6= 0 (3.55)
we get
X(t)
≤
(
p(t)
h0(t)
) 1
κ
if κ > 0
≥
(
h0(t)
p(t)
)− 1
κ
if κ < 0 .
In this case, we can take l(t, x, y, ξ) = 0 and r(t, x, y, ξ) =
(
p(t)
h0(t)
) 1
κ
if κ > 0
l(t, x, y, ξ) =
(
h0(t)
p(t)
)− 1
κ
and r(t, x, y, ξ) =∞ if κ < 0 .
(3.56)
Note that κ < 0 means that unit price goes up when the population goes down (which
becomes more precious). In this case, we want to keep the population above a threshold
h̄(t) :=
(
h0(t)
p(t)
)− 1
κ
. It is interesting to note that when h0(t) is larger, this threshold h̄(t) is
also larger. We have proved
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Proposition 3.7. Under the assumptions (3.50), (3.51), (3.54) and (3.55), the solution
of the mean field singular control problem (3.49) is given by the solution (X̂, Ŷ , ξ̂) of the
Skorohod reflection problem (3.32) and (3.33), with the boundaries l and r given by (3.56).
Next, we continue to assume (3.54). But we replace (3.55) by
h(t, x, y) = h0(t)x
2 + h1(t)x . (3.57)
where h0(t) is positive. Then, inequalities (3.53) become
−p(t) + h0(t)X2(t) + h1(t)X(t) ≤ 0 .
l(t) ≤ X(t) ≤ r(t) , (3.58)
where
l(t) :=
h1(t)−
√
h21(t) + 4h0(t)p(t)
2h0(t)
(3.59)
r(t) :=
h1(t) +
√
h21(t) + 4h0(t)p(t)
2h0(t)
. (3.60)
Similar to Proposition 3.7, we have
Proposition 3.8. Under the assumptions (3.50), (3.51), (3.54) and (3.57), the solution
of the mean field singular control problem (3.49) is given by the solution (X̂, Ŷ , ξ̂) of the
Skorohod reflection problem (3.32) and (3.33), with the boundaries l and r given by (3.58)-
(3.60).
If h is given by (3.57), but with h0(t) < 0, then it can be shown that the domain (3.31)
will be either X(t) ≤ h(t) or X(t) ≥ h̄(t), where h and h̄ are some thresholds which can be
computed similarly.
4 Singular mean-field two-players games
4.1 Sufficient and necessary maximum principles
In this section we consider the stochastic game of two players, each of them is to maximize
his/her singular mean-field performance.
Denote ξ = (ξ1, ξ2), u = (u1, u2), w = (w1, w2), λ = (λ1, λ2), h = (h1, h2) with hi =
(hi,1, hi,2), and let the pair wi = (ξi, ui) represent the control of player i ; i = 1, 2.
Suppose the process X(t) = Xξ,u(t) under control of the two players satisfy the following
stochastic differential equation with jumps.
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dt+ σ(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), u(t), ω)dB(t)
+ λ(t,X(t), u(t), ω)dξ(t), (4.1)
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where Y (t) = F (X(t, ·)), and F is a Fréchet differentiable operator on L2(P ), and we assume
the same dimensions as in the beginning of Section 3.1.
We put Gi = {Git}t≥0 where Git ⊆ Ft is the information available to player i at time t.The
performance functional for player i is assumed to be on the form
Ji(ξ, u) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), ω)dt+ gi(X(T ), Y (T ), ω)
+
∫ T
0
hi,1(t,X(t), u(t), ω)dξ1(t) +
∫ T
0
hi,2(t,X(t), u(t), ω)dξ2(t)
]
; i = 1, 2.
We want to find a Nash equilibrium for this game, i.e. find (ξ∗1 , u
∗
1) ∈ A1 and (ξ∗2 , u∗2) ∈ A2
such that
sup
(ξ1,u1)∈A1
J1(ξ1, u1, ξ
∗
2 , u
∗
2) ≤ J1(ξ∗1 , u∗1, ξ∗2 , u∗2) (4.2)
and
sup
(ξ2,u2)∈A2
J2(ξ
∗
1 , u
∗
1, ξ2, u2) ≤ J2(ξ∗1 , u∗1, ξ∗2 , u∗2) (4.3)
Here Ai is a given family of G(i)-predictable processes such that the corresponding state
equation has a unique solution X such that ω → X(t, ω) ∈ L2(P ) for all t.
We let A(i) denote the set of possible values of ui(t); t ∈ [0, T ] when (ξi, ui) ∈ Ai; i = 1, 2.
We make similar assumptions as in Section 3.1, i.e. we assume that
the functions b, σ, λj, fi, gi and hi,j are progressively measurable with respect to (t, ω) for all
fixed x, y, ξ, u and continuously differentiable with respect to x, y, ξ, u with bounded deriva-
tives.
Define two Hamiltonians Hi; i = 1, 2, as follows:
Hi(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, pi, qi)(dt, dξ1(t), dξ2(t))
= Hi,0(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, pi, qi)dt+
2∑
j=1
{λj(t, x, u)pi + hi,j(t, x, u)}dξj(t) (4.4)
where
Hi,0(t, x, y, w, pi, qi) := fi(t, x, y, w) + b(t, x, y, ξ, u)pi + σ(t, x, y, ξ, u)qi. (4.5)
We assume that for i = 1, 2, H = Hi is Fréchet differentiable (C
1) in the variables x, y, ξ, u.
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The BSDE for the adjoint processes pi, qi is
dpi(t) = −
∂Hi,0
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), pi(t), qi(t))dt
−E
[∂Hi,0
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), pi(t), qi(t))
]
∇X(t)Fdt
−
2∑
j=1
{∂λj
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t))pi(t) +
∂hi,j
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t))}dξj(t) + qi(t)dB(t)
pi(T ) =
∂gi
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E
[
∂gi
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))
]
∇X(T )F ; i = 1, 2.
(4.6)
We now state a sufficient maximum principle for stochastic games with two players and
mean field terms.
Theorem 4.1 (Sufficient maximum principle).
Let (ξ̂1, û1) ∈ A1, (ξ̂2, û2) ∈ A2 with corresponding solutions X̂, p̂i, q̂i, r̂i of (4.1) and
(4.6). Assume the following:
• The maps
X,w1 → H1(t,X, F (X), w1, ŵ2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)), (4.7)
and
X,w2 → H2(t,X, F (X), ŵ1, w2(t), p̂2(t), q̂2(t)), (4.8)
and
X → gi(X,F (X)) (4.9)
are concave for all t; i = 1, 2.
• (The conditional maximum properties)
ess sup
u1∈A1
E[H1(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), u1, ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)) | G(1)t ]
= E[H1(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)) | G(1)t ] a.s. (4.10)
and
ess sup
u2∈A2
E[H2(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), u2, p̂2(t), q̂2(t)) | G(2)t ]
= E[H2(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂2(t), q̂2(t)) | G(2)t ], a.s. (4.11)
• (Variational inequalities)
ess sup
ξ1
E[H1(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ1, û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)) | G(1)t ]
= E[H1(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)) | G(1)t ] a.s. (4.12)
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and
ess sup
ξ2
E[H2(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ2, û2(t), p̂2(t), q̂2(t)) | G(2)t ]
= E[H2(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂2(t), q̂2(t)) | G(2)t ], a.s. (4.13)
Then (ξ̂1, û1), (ξ̂2, û2) is a Nash equilibrium, in the sense that (4.2) and (4.3) hold with
ξ∗i := ξ̂i, u
∗
i := ûi; i = 1, 2.
Proof. By introducing a suitable increasing sequence of stopping times converging to T ,
we see that we may assume that all local martingales appearing in the proof below are
martingales. We refer to [18] for details. We first study the stochastic control problem (4.2).
For simplicity of notation, in the following we put:
X(t) = Xξ1,u1,ξ̂2,û2(t), Y (t) = Y ξ1,u1,ξ̂2,û2(t) and X̂(t) = X ξ̂1,û1,ξ̂2,û2(t), Ŷ (t) = Y ξ̂1,û1,ξ̂2,û2(t),
b(t) = b(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ1(t), ξ2(t), u1(t), u2(t), ω), b̂(t) = b(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ1(t), ξ̂2(t), u1(t), û2(t), ω)
and similarly with σ(t), σ̂(t).
Consider J1(ξ1, u1, ξ̂2, û2)− J1(ξ̂1, û1, ξ̂2, û2) = I1 + I2 + I3 + I4, where
I1 := E
[∫ T
0
{f1(t,X(t), Y (t), w1(t), ŵ2(t))− f1(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ŵ1(t), ŵ2(t))}dt
]
I2 := E[g1(X(T ), Y (T ))− g1(X̂(T ), Ŷ (T ))]
I3 := E
[∫ T
0
{h1,1(t,X(t), w1(t), ŵ2(t))dξ1(t)− h1,1(t, X̂(t), ŵ(t))dξ̂1(t)}
]
I4 := E
[∫ T
0
{h1,2(t,X(t), w1(t), ŵ2(t))dξ2(t)− h1,2(t, X̂(t), ŵ(t))dξ̂2(t)}
]
By the definition of H1 we have
I1 = E[
∫ T
0
{H1,0(t,Xt, Yt, w1(t), ŵ2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t))
−H1,0(t, X̂t, Ŷt, ŵ(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t))− (b(t)− b̂(t))p̂1(t)− (σ(t)− σ̂(t))q̂1(t)}dt] (4.14)
By concavity of g1 and the Itô formula we have
I2 ≤ E
[
∂g1
∂x
(X̂(T ), Ŷ (T )))(X(T )− X̂(T ))
+
∂g1
∂y
(X̂(T ), Ŷ (T ))〈∇X̂(T )F,X(T )− X̂(T )〉
]
= E〈p̂1(T ), X(T )− X̂(T )〉
= E
[∫ T
0
p̂1(t)dX̃(t) +
∫ T
0
X̃(t)dp̂1(t) +
∫ T
0
q̂1(t)σ̃(t)dt
]
, (4.15)
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where we have put
X̃(t) := X(t)− X̂(t), σ̃(t) := σ(t)− σ̂(t). (4.16)
Note that
E
[∫ T
0
p̂1(t)dX̃(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
p̂1(t)(b(t)− b̂(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
p̂1(t)(λ1dξ1(t)− λ̂1dξ̂1(t) + λ2dξ̂2(t)− λ̂2dξ̂2(t))
]
. (4.17)
and that
E
[∫ T
0
X̃(t)dp̂1(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
X̃(t)
(
{−∂H1,0
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t), r̂1(t))
−∂H1,0
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t), r̂1(t))∇X(t)F}dt−
2∑
j=1
{∂λj
∂x
(t)p1(t) +
∂h1,j
∂x
(t)}dξj(t)
)]
(4.18)
Combining (4.18) with I3 and I4 we get
J1 − Ĵ1 := J1(ξ1, u1, ξ̂2, û2)− J1(ξ̂1, û1, ξ̂2, û2)
≤ E
[∫ T
0
{H1(t)− Ĥ1(t)−
∂Ĥ1
∂x
(X − X̂)− ∂Ĥ1
∂y
∇F (X − X̂)}
]
= E
[∫ T
0
E[H1(t)− Ĥ1(t)−
∂Ĥ1
∂x
(X − X̂)− ∂Ĥ1
∂y
∇F (X − X̂) | G(1)t ]
]
(4.19)
where Ĥ1(t) means that H1 is evaluated at (t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), û(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)), while H1(t)
means that H1 is evaluated at (t,X(t), Y (t), ξ1(t), u1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t)).
Note that by concavity of H1 we have
H1(t,X, F (X), ξ1, u1, ξ̂2, û2, p̂1, q̂1)−H1(t, X̂, F (X̂), ξ̂1, û1, ξ̂2, û2, p̂1, q̂1)
≤ ∂Ĥ1
∂x
(X̂)(X − X̂) + ∂Ĥ1
∂y
(X̂)∇X̂F (X − X̂) +∇ξ1Ĥ1(ξ̂)(ξ1 − ξ̂1) +
∂Ĥ1
∂u1
(û)(u1 − û1)
(4.20)
Therefore, to obtain that J1 − Ĵ1 ≤ 0, it suffices that
E[∇ξ1Ĥ1(ξ̂) | G
(1)
t ](ξ1 − ξ̂1) ≤ 0 a.s. (4.21)
for all ξ1, and that
E[
∂Ĥ1
∂u1
(û) | G(1)t ](u1 − û1) ≤ 0 a.s. (4.22)
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for all u1. The inequality (4.22) holds by our assumption (4.10), and the inequality (4.21)
holds by our assumption (4.12). The difference
J2(ξ̂1, û1, ξ2, u2)− J2(ξ̂1, û1, ξ̂2, û2)
is handled similarly. 
We proved above a verification theorem, stating sufficient conditions to obtain a Nash
equilibrium. We now establish a partial converse, implying that a Nash equilibrium for the
singular control game is a conditional saddle point for the Hamiltonian.
Theorem 4.2 (Necessary maximum principle).
Suppose ŵ1 = (ξ̂1, ûi) ∈ A1 and ŵ2 = (ξ̂2, û2) ∈ A2 constitute a Nash equilibrium for the
game, i.e. satisfies (4.2) and (4.3). Then
E
[
∂H1
∂u1
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), u1, ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂1(t), q̂1(t))u1=û1(t) | G
(1)
t
]
= 0 a.s. (4.23)
and
E
[
∂H2
∂u2
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), u2, p̂2(t), q̂2(t))u2=û2(t) | G
(2)
t
]
= 0 a.s. (4.24)
Moreover, the following variational inequalities hold:
E
[
∂Hi,0
∂ξi
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ŵ(t)) + λi(t, X̂(t), û(t))p̂i(t) + hii(t, X̂(t), ŵ(t)) | G(i)t
]
≤ 0
for all t, i = 1, 2 , and
E
[
∂Hi,0
∂ξi
(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ŵ(t)) + λi(t, X̂(t), û(t))p̂i(t) + hii(t, X̂(t), ŵ(t)) | G(i)t
]
dξ̂i(t) = 0
for all t, i = 1, 2.
(4.25)
Proof. This theorem can be proved in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 3.4 with an
adjustment to the stochastic game case. The adjustment is similar to one in the proof of
Theorem 4.1. 
4.2 The zero-sum game case
In the zero-sum case we have
J1(w1, w2) + J2(w1, w2) = 0. (4.26)
Then the Nash equilibrium (ŵ1, ŵ2) ∈ A1×A2 satisfying (4.2)-(4.3) becomes a saddle point
for
J(w1, w2) := J1(w1, w2). (4.27)
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To see this, note that (4.2)-(4.3) imply that
J1(w1, ŵ2) ≤ J1(ŵ1, ŵ2) = −J2(ŵ1, ŵ2) ≤ −J2(ŵ1, w2)
and hence
J(w1, ŵ2) ≤ J(ŵ1, ŵ2) ≤ J(ŵ1, w2) for all w1, w2.
From this we deduce that
inf
w2∈A2
sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, w2) ≤ sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, ŵ2) ≤ J(ŵ1, ŵ2)
≤ inf
w2∈A2
J(ŵ1, w2) ≤ sup
w1∈A1
inf
w2∈A2
J(w1, w2). (4.28)
Since we always have inf sup ≥ sup inf, we conclude that
inf
w2∈A2
sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, w2) = sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, ŵ2) = J(ŵ1, ŵ2)
= inf
w2∈A2
J(ŵ1, w2) = sup
w1∈A1
inf
w2∈A2
J(w1, w2). (4.29)
i.e. (ŵ1, ŵ2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is a saddle point for J(w1, w2).
Hence we want to find (ŵ1, ŵ2) ∈ A1 ×A2 such that
sup
w1∈A1
inf
w2∈A2
J(w1, w2) = inf
w2∈A2
sup
w1∈A1
J(w1, w2) = J(ŵ1, ŵ2), (4.30)
where
J(w1, w2) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), ω)dt+ g(X(T ), Y (T ), ω)
+
∫ T
0
h1(t,X(t), w(t), ω)dξ1(t) +
∫ T
0
h2(t,X(t), w(t), ω)dξ2(t)
]
. (4.31)
As shown in [17], in this case only one Hamiltonian H is needed, namely
H(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, p, q)(dt, dξ1(t), dξ2(t))
= H0(t, x, y, ξ1, u1, ξ2, u2, p, q)dt+
2∑
j=1
{λj(t, x, u)p+ hj(t, x, ξ, u)}dξj(t) (4.32)
where
H0(t, x, y, w, p, q) := f(t, x, y, w) + b(t, x, y, w)p+ σ(t, x, y, w)q (4.33)
and we have put gi = g, hi = h1,i ; i = 1, 2 and f1 = f = −f2.
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Moreover, there is only one couple (p, q) of adjoint processes, given by the BSDE
dp(t) = −∂H0
∂x
(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−E
[∂H0
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), w(t), p(t), q(t))
]
∇X(t)F )dt
−
2∑
j=1
{∂λj
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t))p(t) +
∂hj
∂x
(t,X(t), w(t))}dξj(t) + q(t)dB(t)
p(T ) =
∂g
∂x
(X(T ), Y (T )) + E[
∂g
∂y
(X(T ), Y (T ))]∇X(T )F.
(4.34)
We can now state the corresponding sufficient maximum principle for the zero-sum game:
Theorem 4.3 (Sufficient maximum principle for zero-sum singular mean-field games). Let
(ŵ1, ŵ2) ∈ A1×A2, with corresponding solutions X̂(t), Ŷ (t), p̂(t), q̂(t). Suppose the following
holds
• The function
X,w1 → H(t,X, F (X), w1, ŵ2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) (4.35)
is concave for all t, the function
X,w2 → H(t,X, F (X), ŵ1(t), w2, p̂(t), q̂(t)) (4.36)
is convex for all t, and the function
X → g(X,F (X)) (4.37)
is affine.
• (The conditional maximum property)
ess sup
v1∈A1
E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), v1, ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(1)t ]
= E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(1)t ] (4.38)
and
ess inf
v2∈A2
E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), v2, p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(2)t ]
= E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(2)t ]. (4.39)
• (Variational inequalities)
ess sup
ξ1
E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ1, û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(1)t ]
= E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(1)t ] (4.40)
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and
ess inf
ξ2
E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ2, û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(2)t ]
= E[H(t, X̂(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂1(t), û1(t), ξ̂2(t), û2(t), p̂(t), q̂(t)) | G(2)t ]. (4.41)
Then û(t) = (û1(t), û2(t)) is a saddle point for J(u1, u2).
Proof. The proof is similar to (and simpler than) the proof of Theorem 4.1 and is omitted.

5 Applications
5.1 A mean field investment game
We return to the mean field singular game of Section 2.2. In this case, we get from (4.4)
Hi(t, x, y, ξ1, ξ2, pi, qi)(dt, dξ1(t), dξ2(t))
= πmin(x, ξ1 + ξ2) + yb(t)pi + xσ(t)qi + h1dξ1(t) + h2dξ2(t)
and the adjoint equations (4.6) becomes
dpi(t) = −
[
χ[0,ξ1+ξ2)(x)π(t) + σ(t)qi(t) + b(t)pi(t)
]
dt+ qi(t)dB(t) ; pi(T ) = 0 .
The variational inequalities (4.25) get the form{
π(t)χ[0,X(t))(ξ1(t) + ξ2(t)) + hi(t) ≤ 0 and[
π(t)χ[0,X(t))(ξ1(t) + ξ2(t)) + hi(t)
]
dξi(t) = 0 ; i = 1, 2 .
and the optimal strategy for factory 1 is:
i) If π(t) + h1(t) < 0, do nothing.
ii) If π(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 increase ξ1(t) to X(t)− ξ∗2(t).
In other words, (ξ1, X) solves the reflected Skorohod problem{
ξ1(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ∗2(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h1(t))[
ξ1(t)− (X(t)− ξ∗2(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h1(t))
]
dξ1(t) = 0 .
(5.1)
So for given ξ∗2 we choose ξ1 := R1(ξ
∗
2) solution of (5.1). Similarly, given ξ
∗
1 we choose
ξ2 := R2(ξ
∗
1) as the solution of{
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ∗1(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h2(t))[
ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ∗1(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h2(t))
]
dξ2(t) = 0 .
(5.2)
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Thus, to find the Nash equilibrium we need to solve the following coupled problem:
ξ1(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ2(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h1(t))[
ξ1(t)− (X(t)− ξ2(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h1(t))
]
dξ1(t) = 0 ;
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ1(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h2(t))[
ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ1(t))χ[0,∞)(π(t) + h2(t))
]
dξ2(t) = 0 .
(5.3)
The above system of reflected Skorohod problems can be solved in the following way:
We divide the interval [0, T ] into 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T such that on each interval
[tk, tk+1) the signs of π(t) + h1(t) and π(t) + h2(t) remains unchanged. On each interval
[tk, tk+1], we use the following control principles. If both of the inequalities π(t) + h1(t) < 0
and π(t) + h2(t) < 0 hold, then do nothing. If π(t) + h1(t) < 0 and π(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0, then
the first factory does not do anything. The second condition in (5.3) becomes{
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ1(t))
[ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ1(t)))] dξ2(t) = 0 .
By Remark 2.7 (namely, Equation (2.8)) of [4],
ξ2(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
(X(s)− ξ1(tk))+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
Thus, we keep ξ1(t) = ξ1(tk) unchanged and in the same time increase ξ2(t) to X(t)− ξ1(t).
Similar result holds if π(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 and π(t) + h2(t) < 0.
If both π(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 and π(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0, then (5.3) becomes
ξ1(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ2(t))
[ξ1(t)− (X(t)− ξ2(t))] dξ1(t) = 0 ;
ξ2(t) ≥ (X(t)− ξ1(t))
[ξ2(t)− (X(t)− ξ1(t)))] dξ2(t) = 0 .
(5.4)
Let ξ(t) = ξ1(t) + ξ2(t) and then (5.4) is equivalent to{
ξ(t) ≥ X(t)
[ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ(t) = 0 .
Again by Remark 2.7 (namely, Equation (2.8)) of [4], we have
ξ(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
X(s)+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
Now we show that any decomposition of ξ(t) into the sum of two nondecreasing processes
ξ1(t) and ξ2(t) will solve (5.4). In fact, assume ξ(t) = ξ1(t) + ξ2(t), where ξ1 and ξ2 are two
nondecreasing processes. Since ξ(t) ≥ X(t) and ξ1 and ξ2 are nondecreasing, we have{
[ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ1(t) ≥ 0
[ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ2(t) ≥ 0 .
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Adding them we have
[ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ1(t) + [ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ2(t) = [ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ(t) = 0 .
This implies {
[ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ1(t) = 0
[ξ(t)−X(t)] dξ2(t) = 0 .
Thus, ξ1 and ξ2 satisfies (5.4). Summarizing we have
Proposition 5.1. Assume that we can divide the interval [0, T ] into 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · <
tn = T such that on each interval [tk, tk+1) the signs of π(t) + h1(t) and π(t) + h2(t) remain
unchanged. Then we can recursively find the solution ξ1 and ξ2 on each interval [tk, tk+1] for
k = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1. On the interval [tk, tk+1], we have
(i) If both inequalities π(t) + h1(t) < 0 and π(t) + h2(t) < 0 hold, then do nothing.
(ii) If π(t) + h1(t) < 0 but π(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0, then
ξ1(t) = ξ1(tk) , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1
and
ξ2(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
(X(s)− ξ1(tk))+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
If π(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 but π(t) + h2(t) < 0, then
ξ2(t) = ξ2(tk) , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1
and
ξ1(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
(X(s)− ξ2(tk))+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
(iii) If both inequalities π(t) + h1(t) ≥ 0 and π(t) + h2(t) ≥ 0 hold, then ξ1 and ξ2 can be
any nondecreasing processes such that
ξ1(t) + ξ2(t) = sup
tk≤s≤t
X(s)+ , tk ≤ t ≤ tk+1 .
Note that in this case the Nash equilibrium is not unique.
5.2 Model uncertainty singular control
We represent model uncertainty by a family of probability measures Q = Qθ equivalent to
P , with the Radon-Nikodym derivative on Ft given by
d(Q | Ft)
d(P | Ft)
= Gθ(t) (5.5)
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where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Gθ(t) is an exponential martingale of the form
dGθ(t) = Gθ(t)θ(t)dB(t); Gθ(0) = 1. (5.6)
Here θ may be regarded as a scenario control. Let A1 denote a given family of admissible
singular controls ξ and let A2 denote a given set of admissible scenario controls θ such that
E[
∫ T
0
θ2(t)dt] <∞. (5.7)
Now assume that X1(t) = X
ξ
1(t) is a singularly controlled mean-field Itô process of the form
dX1(t) = b1(t,X1(t), Y (t), ω)dt+ σ1(t,X1(t), Y (t), ω)dB(t) + λ1(t,X1(t), ω)dξ(t), (5.8)
where
Y (t) = F (X1(t, ·)), (5.9)
and F is a Fréchet differentiable operator on L2(P ). Let G(1) = {G(1)t }0≤t≤T and G(2) =
{G(2)t }0≤t≤T be given subfiltrations of F = {Ft}0≤t≤T , representing the information available
to the controllers at time t. It is required that ξ ∈ A1 be G(1)-predictable, and θ ∈ A2 be
G(2)-predictable. We consider the stochastic differential game to find (ξ̂, θ̂) ∈ A1 ×A2 such
that
sup
ξ∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)] = EQθ̂ [j(ξ̂, θ̂)] = infθ∈A2
sup
ξ∈A1
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)], (5.10)
where
j(ξ, θ) =
∫ T
0
{f1(t,X1(t), Y (t), ξ(t), ω) + ρ(θ(t))}dt
+ g1(X1(T ), Y (T ), ω) +
∫ T
0
h1(t,X1(t), ω)ξ(dt). (5.11)
The term EQθ [
∫ T
0
ρ(θ(t))dt] can be seen as a penalty term, penalizing the difference between
Qθ and the original probability measure P . Note that since Gθ(t) is a martingale we have
EQθ [j(ξ, θ)] = E
[∫ T
0
Gθ(t){f1(t,X1(t), Y (t), ξ(t))) + ρ(θ(t)}dt+Gθ(T )g1(X1(T ), Y (T ))
+
∫ T
0
Gθ(t)h1(t,X1(t))dξ(t)
]
=: J(ξ, θ). (5.12)
We see that this is a mean-field singular control stochastic differential game of the type
discussed in Section 4.2, with a two-dimensional state space X(t) := (X1(t), X2(t)), with
X2(t) = G
θ(t) and with
f(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), θ(t))) := X2(t){f1(t,X1(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + ρ(θ(t))}, (5.13)
g(X(T ), Y (T )) := X2(T )g1(X1(T ), Y (T )), (5.14)
h(t,X(t)) := X2(t)h1(t,X1(t)). (5.15)
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We get the following Hamiltonian for the game (5.10):
H(t, x1, x2, y, ξ, θ, p, q, r)(dt, dξ(t))
= H0(t, x1, x2, y, ξ, θ, p, q)dt+ {λ1(t, x1)p1 + x2h1(t, x1)}dξ(t) (5.16)
where
H0(t, x1, x2, y, ξ, θ, p, q) = x2{f1(t, x1, y, ξ)+ρ(θ)}+b1(t, x1, y)p1+σ(t, x1, y)q1+x2θq2. (5.17)
The corresponding mean-field BSDEs for the adjoint processes become
dp1(t) = −
∂H0
∂x1
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), θ(t), p(t), q(t))dt
−E
[∂H0
∂y
(t,X(t), Y (t), ξ(t), θ(t), p(t), q(t))
]
∇X1(t)F )dt
−{∂λ1
∂x1
(t,X1(t))p1(t) + x2
∂h1
∂x1
(t,X1(t))}dξ(t) + q1(t)dB(t)
p1(T ) = X2(T )
∂g1
∂x1
(X1(T ), Y (T )) + E[
∂g1
∂y
(X1(T ), Y (T ))]∇X1(T )F
(5.18)
and {
dp2(t) = −{f1(t,X1(t), Y (t), ξ(t)) + ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)q2(t)}dt+ q2(t)dB(t)
p2(T ) = g1(X1(T ), Y (T )).
(5.19)
Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θ gives the following first order condition:
∂ρ
∂θ
(t) = −E[q2(t) | G(2)t ]. (5.20)
The variational inequalities (4.25) reduce to{
E[X̂2(t)∇ξf1(t, X̂1(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), θ̂(t)) + λ1(t, X̂1(t))p̂1(t) + X̂2(t)h1(t, X̂1(t)) | G(1)t ] ≤ 0;
E[X̂2(t)∇ξf1(t, X̂1(t), Ŷ (t), ξ̂(t), θ̂(t)) + λ1(t, X̂1(t))p̂1(t) + X̂2(t)h1(t, X̂1(t)) | G(1)t ]dξ̂(t) = 0.
(5.21)
In general it seems to be a formidable mathematical challenge to solve such a coupled system
of forward-backward singular SDEs. However, in some cases a possible solution procedure
could be described, as in the next example.
5.3 Optimal harvesting under uncertainty
Let us consider a model uncertainty version of the optimal harvesting problem introduced
in Section 2.1. For simplicity we put K = 1. Thus we have the following mean-field forward
system (Xξ, Gθ), where Gθ is given by (5.6) and
dX(t) = dXξ(t) = E[Xξ(t)]b(t)dt+Xξ(t)σ(t)dB(t)− λ0(t)dξ(t); Xξ(0−) = x > 0, (5.22)
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with performance functional
J(ξ, θ) = E[
∫ T
0
Gθ(t)ρ(θ(t))dt+
∫ T
0
Gθ(t)h0(t)X
ξ(t)dξ(t) +Gθ(T )Xξ(T )]. (5.23)
The model uncertainty harvesting problem is to find (ξ∗, θ∗) ∈ A1 ×A2 such that
sup
ξ∈A1
inf
θ∈A2
J(ξ, θ = inf
θ∈A2
sup
ξ∈A1
J(ξ, θ) = J(ξ∗, θ∗). (5.24)
We assume that the controllers have full information, so it is required that ξ ∈ A1 be
F-predictable, and θ ∈ A2 be F-predictable.
Here the Hamiltonian is
H(t, x, g, y, ξ, θ, p, q)(dt, ξ(dt))
= {gρ(θ) + yb(t)p1 + xσ(t)q1 + gθq2}dt+ {−λ0(t)p1 + xgh0(t)}dξ(t). (5.25)
Minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to θ gives the first order equation
ρ′(θ)(t) = −q2(t). (5.26)
The corresponding reflected backward system is
dp1(t) = −[b(t)p1(t) + σ(t)q1(t)]dt− h0(t)Gθ(t)dξ(t) + q1(t)dB(t); p1(T ) = Gθ(T ) (5.27)
dp2(t) = −[ρ(θ(t)) + θ(t)q2(t)]dt− h0(t)X(t)dξ(t) + q2(t)dB(t); p2(T ) = X(T ) (5.28)
with variational inequalities{
−λ0(t)p1(t) +X(t)Gθ(t)h0(t) ≤ 0;
[−λ0(t)p1(t) +X(t)Gθ(t)h0(t)]dξ(t) = 0
(5.29)
Then we get the following result:
Proposition 5.2. Suppose there exists a solution X̂(t) := X ξ̂(t), Ĝ(t) := Gθ̂(t), p̂1(t),
q̂1(t), p̂2(t), q̂2(t), ξ̂(t), θ̂(t) of the coupled system of mean-field forward-backward singular
stochastic differential equations consisting of the forward equations (5.22) and the reflected
backward equations (5.27),(5.28), and satisfying the constraint (5.29). Then ξ̂(t) is the opti-
mal harvesting strategy and θ̂(t) is the optimal scenario parameter for the model uncertainty
harvesting problem (5.24).
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